By Floris Faber
In the wake of scandals like Qatargate, some political actors are once again pointing the finger at civil society organisations (CSOs). A new report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on EU funding to NGOs is being seized upon as evidence that civil society is not to be trusted. But this reading distorts what the report actually says – and risks weakening one of the EU’s greatest strengths: its independent public sphere.
The ECA report makes some valid and important points. There are real gaps in how EU funding to NGOs is tracked, and a lack of a shared understanding of what counts as an NGO. The systems for transparency are improving, but not yet robust. And yes, there should be more consistency in how the EU ensures recipients of public funds respect its values[1]. But what the report does not say is that NGOs are misusing funds or acting in bad faith[2]. Nor does it question their right to exist, to receive operating grants, or to advocate for change. It is a report about administrative systems and oversight – not a political verdict.
Yet, it’s being used that way by some. The danger is that this contributes to a broader narrative that blames civil society for problems it did not cause. We’ve seen this before, in other parts of the world and now increasingly within the EU itself: independent voices that hold power to account are dismissed as “partisan” or “foreign-funded.” This trend is not just bad for NGOs. It’s bad for democracy.
Civil society is not the problem – it’s part of the solution
The EU Treaties are clear: the Union must engage in “open, transparent and regular dialogue with civil society.”[3] This isn’t a nice-to-have. It’s a foundational principle of EU governance. And it applies not just to development or social inclusion, but to the whole spectrum of internal and external policy.
Most EU funds do not go to NGOs. Under internal policies, the figure is less than 4%[4], and even less under some shared management programmes (i.e. Programmes jointly managed by the European Commission and Member States). Where NGOs do receive funds, they are among the most heavily scrutinised actors. And unlike other recipients, they often voluntarily publish additional information about their work, donors and governance[5].
What is sometimes missing, however, is a sense of why civil society matters. It’s not just about service delivery or local presence. CSOs act as watchdogs. They bring lived experience into policy. They mobilise communities. They defend rights. In doing so, they strengthen EU institutions, not undermine them.
Who really shapes EU rules?
A recent academic paper by Matti Ylönen, an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at the University of Helsinki, offers a helpful lens here. He revisits the idea of the “Brussels Effect” – the EU’s ability to shape global rules through the strength of its internal regulations. Think of GDPR: when the EU introduced it, companies around the world had to adapt. It’s often cited as a key example of the Brussels Effect—where EU rules become global standards[6].
But Ylönen argues that this is not a one-way process. Increasingly, multinational corporations and foreign governments are working hard to influence the EU’s rule-making from the inside. In the tech sector for example, firms have become some of the biggest lobbying powers in Brussels, actively shaping EU regulation[7]. Others have warned of a growing risk of “astroturfing” – where corporate actors support or create organisations that appear to be grassroots civil society, but in fact serve private interests. According to Ylönen, this has included big tech firms funding organisations that appear to represent small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)[8].
He warns that these efforts, if unchecked, can undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU regulation. The regulatory capacity that underpins the Brussels Effect can be weakened by discursive capture – where powerful actors shape the terms of the debate, lobbying, and the hollowing out of institutions[9].
In this context, civil society is essential. CSOs are among the few actors trying to defend the public interest in EU policymaking. If they are pushed out or discredited, the door opens wider to corporate capture and foreign interference.
Civic space and regulatory space go hand in hand
We cannot separate the Brussels Effect from the question of civic space. If we care about the EU’s global influence, we must also care about who gets to shape its rules at home.
The ECA highlights that the EU’s current systems for checking recipients’ alignment with its values are uneven and rely too much on self-declaration[1]. That’s not just a civil society issue—it affects all recipients. A more consistent, transparent approach would support public trust and protect the EU’s credibility. But improving systems should not be confused with casting blanket suspicion on civil society.
Yes, perhaps we do need more clarity in how NGOs are defined and registered. But let’s be careful: overly narrow definitions could exclude the very organisations that speak for marginalised communities. Ylönen suggests that overly rigid categorisations can miss how hybrid or evolving civil society actors operate[10].
Instead, we should strengthen transparency and accountability across the board – for all recipients of EU funds. We should invest in robust systems that distinguish genuine civil society from front groups. And we should reaffirm that advocacy is not a threat to democracy. It is a sign of it.
Rebuilding trust means backing the watchdogs
In the years ahead, EU institutions will face growing pressure: from geopolitics, from populist narratives, and from inside actors who prefer opacity to scrutiny. One way to withstand that pressure is to double down on the values that make the EU credible.
Civil society is not the problem. It is a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. And if we want the EU to remain a rule-maker in the world, not a rule-taker, we should protect and resource the actors who help keep its rules fair, inclusive and enforceable.
Let’s not blame the watchdogs. Let’s make sure they can still bark.
Footnotes
- ECA Report, paragraph 52: “We would thus expect all EU grant contracts to include the obligation to respect EU values… [and] to proactively verify compliance…”
- ECA Report, paragraph 7: “Our audit shows that EU funding granted to NGOs… was not sufficiently transparent, although we have observed improvements…”
- Treaty on European Union, Article 11(2)
- ECA Report, Figure 2 (page 6): “NGOs received less than 4% of funding… for the selected internal policies…”
- ECA Report, paragraph 58: “NGOs scored well as regards disclosing information on governing bodies and their missions…”
- Ylönen, p. 2: GDPR is described as a “poster child” of both the de jure and de facto forms of the Brussels Effect, having influenced companies directly and inspired third countries to adopt similar data protection rules.
- Ylönen, p. 12: Describes tech firms as among the largest lobbying powers, actively shaping regulation.
- Ylönen, p. 12: “In tech policy, this has involved big tech firms funding organisations that presumably represent small- and medium-sized enterprises.”
- Ylönen, p. 12: Describes how lobbying, “discursive capture” and “epistemic dominance” can flood decision-making with conflicting inputs and weaken the regulatory capacity that sustains the Brussels Effect.
- Ylönen (p. 9) warns that essentialist classifications—fixed ideas about who counts as a legitimate actor—risk overlooking hybrid or unconventional forms of civic or political engagement.
